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What caused the mid-2000s world commodity price “bubble” and the recent commodity 
price growth during the economic recovery after the 2007-2009 recession? The classical “supply 
and demand” interpretation offered by some observers suggests that rapid global industrial 
growth over the past decade – the so-called “demand channel” – is the key driver of price 
growth.  Others have argued that recent bouts of commodity price growth were directly related 
to central banks, especially the U.S. Federal Reserve, injecting too much money or “liquidity” 
into the financial system.  They assert that high commodity prices are a result of excessively 
loose monetary policy. 
 This paper extends the current research in this area by incorporating emerging economies, 
the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations specifically, into global measures.  It is 
hypothesized that factoring BRIC nations into the analysis provides useful information for 
examining the relationship between commodity prices and global liquidity that is not captured 
by advanced country data alone. 
 The statistical model in this paper accounts for the two-way relationships that can exist 
between output, price, and monetary variables in a globally interconnected system.  Various 
tests of the model consistently suggest that the “demand channel” plays a large part in 
explaining commodity price growth whether BRIC countries are included or excluded from the 
analysis.  However, excess liquidity may also play a part in explaining price growth.  In 
addition, factoring in BRIC country data leads to the conclusion that unexpected movements in 
liquidity eventually explain more of the variation in commodity prices than unexpected demand 
shocks.  This specific result is not caught in the sample that only incorporates advanced 
economies.  Therefore, policymakers and researchers should not ignore emerging markets when 
examining commodity prices and monetary factors in a global context.  Studies that exclude 
these countries lose key information on the effects of global monetary fluctuations. 
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I. Introduction	
The	commodity	price	bubble	of	the	mid‐2000s	and	the	slow	recovery	after	2009	following		
the	Federal	Reserve	Bank’s	easy	monetary	policy	have	prompted	many	observers	 to	suggest	 that	
the	relationship	between	easy	policy	and	commodity	prices	 is	actually	causal.	 	Studies	by	Frankel	
(1986,	 2008)	 and	 others	 on	 US,	 euro	 zone,	 and	 globally	 aggregated	 variables	 suggest	 that	
expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 commodity	 prices.	 	 However,	 several	
studies	 also	 suggest	 that	 industrial	 demand	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 price	 increases.	 	 This	 “demand‐
channel”	explanation	argues	that	growing	worldwide	economic	growth	is	an	alternative	and	more	
plausible	explanation	for	recent	commodity	price	inflation.	
Concerns	over	commodity	price	inflation	are	warranted	not	just	because	they	raise	costs	for	
producers	of	goods	and	consumers	of	raw	materials,	but	also	because	there	is	evidence	to	support	
that	 they	 have	 worked	 their	 way	 into	 boosting	 consumer	 prices	 overall	 (Furlong	 and	 Ignatio	
(1996)).	 	 Furlong	and	 Ignatio	 (1996),	Krichene	 (2008),	 and	Evans	and	Fischer	 (2011)	argue	 that	
while	commodity	price	inflation	was	strongly	correlated	with	US	CPI	inflation	in	the	1970s,	later	on	
(in	 the	 case	 of	 Evans	 and	 Fischer	 (2011)	 in	 the	 post‐Volcker	 era	 (post‐1982)),	 the	 link	 between	
commodities	and	the	CPI	became	very	weak.		Besides	the	explanation	that	the	Federal	Reserve	has	
become	better	at	managing	inflation,	Evans	and	Fischer	(2011)	suggest	that	this	weak	correlation	is	
due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 raw	 commodities	 make	 up	 a	 smaller	 proportion	 of	 the	 US	 CPI	 and	 that	 US	
businesses	are	less	“commodity‐intense”	in	their	production,	so	commodities	figure	into	a	smaller	
share	of	costs	for	both	households	and	businesses.	
Nonetheless,	since	the	CPI	is	a	key	indicator	used	by	central	banks,	Kirchene	(2008)	argues	
that	they	risk	ignoring	fluctuations	in	commodity	and	other	asset	markets	that	do	not	show	up	in	
the	 CPI.	 	 In	 addition,	 rapid	 increases	 in	 food	 prices	 in	 developing	 countries	 could	 not	 sustain	
themselves	and	lead	to	riots,	as	they	did	in	2007	and	2008,	unless	they	were	the	result	of	external	
monetary	 factors.	 	 Kirchene	 suggests	 that	 over	 a	 20‐month	 period	 in	 2007‐8,	 the	 LIBOR	 rate	 (a	
proxy	for	a	global	interest	rate)	explained	a	large	share	of	the	variance	in	commodity	prices.		Policy	
makers	in	2007	and	2008	faced	a	dilemma:	by	raising	interest	rates	to	stem	the	commodity	bubble,	
they	 risked	 pushing	 the	 economy	 into	 a	 recession.	 	 If	 central	 bankers	 are	 truly	 concerned	 about	
commodity	 prices	 now,	 they	 face	 a	 similar	 dilemma	 as	 most	 of	 the	 developed	 world	 is	 still	
languishing	in	a	drawn‐out	recovery	in	output	and	employment.	
Movements	in	commodity	prices	have	been	suggested	as	a	leading	indicator	of	inflation	and	
the	economy	in	general.		Prices	are	set	continuously	and	data	is	reported	in	real	time	(Awokuse	and	
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Yang	(2003)),	providing	a	distinct	advantage	over	CPI,	which	is	reported	with	a	lag	and	in	monthly	
increments.		Although	commodities	are	subject	to	“market‐specific”	shocks	which	may	not	transfer	
into	 the	 broader	 economy,	 Awokuse	 and	 Yang	 (2003)	 find	 that	 the	 broad	 CRB	 index	 is	 a	 useful	
leading	indicator	of	the	federal	funds	rate,	inflation,	and	industrial	production.			
	 While	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 global	 monetary	 liquidity	 and	 commodity	
prices	 that	 only	 factors	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 developed	 world	 may	 have	 passed	merit	 several	
decades	ago,	modern	analyses	that	expect	to	be	representative	of	global	behavior	cannot	ignore	the	
role	 of	 emerging	markets.	 	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 they	must	 show	 that	 their	 results	 are	 robust	when	
emerging	 market	 data	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 	 This	 analysis	 restricts	 its	 inclusion	 of	 emerging	
markets	 to	 the	so‐called	“BRIC”	countries	 ‐	Brazil,	Russia,	 India,	and	China.	 	From	Q2	1995	to	Q2	
2010,	the	share	of	world	output	held	by	the	advanced	countries	analyzed	 in	this	paper	shrank	by	
nine	percentage	points,	while	the	share	held	by	the	BRIC	countries	increased	by	this	exact	amount.		
As	a	percentage	of	the	sum	of	money	supplies	of	the	10	advanced	countries,	euro	zone,	and	the	BRIC	
countries,	the	share	of	the	money	supply	from	the	BRIC	countries	grew	from	6%	to	21%	over	that	
same	period.	
Shostak	 (2006)	 suggests	 that	China’s	expansionary	monetary	policy	 in	 the	2000s	coupled	
with	its	artificially	low	exchange	rate	led	to	increased	demand	in	China	for	US	dollar‐denominated	
assets,	including	commodities.		In	order	to	maintain	its	exchange	rate	China’s	Central	bank	has	had	
to	 periodically	 buy	 US	 dollars,	 which	 increased	 the	 liquidity	 of	 the	 yuan.	 	 This	 could	 create	 a	
situation	 where	 liquidity	 expands	 beyond	 what	 is	 necessary	 for	 output,	 and	 could	 instead	 be	
funneled	into	other	assets	(e.g.	commodities),	pushing	up	their	price.	
This	paper	uses	a	Vector	Error	Correction	(VEC)	model	to	examine	the	relationship	between	
commodity	prices,	excess	liquidity,	interest	rates,	output,	and	consumer	prices.		This	model	allows	
two‐way	 relationships	 between	 all	 of	 the	 variables	 in	 the	model.	 	 Although	 the	 variables	 in	 this	
analysis	 are	 non‐stationary	 in	 their	 levels	 and	 I(1),	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	 variables	 are	
cointegrated,	which	 is	 the	 impetus	behind	 estimating	 a	VEC	 rather	 than	 a	Vector	Autoregression	
(VAR).			
Like	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006),	Hua	(1998),	and	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	variables,	except	
commodity	prices,	are	weighted	averages	or	sums	that	represent	global	aggregates.		However,	the	
difference	between	those	papers	and	this	one	is	that	in	this	paper	two	samples	are	estimated	
 ADV	–	a	sample	which	aggregates	10	advanced	economies	and	the	euro	zone	economies	
similar	to	the	countries	included	in	the	previous	literature.	
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 ALL	 –	 a	 sample	 which	 aggregates	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 ADV	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 BRIC	
countries.	
Since	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 are	 beginning	 to	 wield	 more	 economic	 power	 and	 influence,	 it	 is	
hypothesized	 that	 they	 convey	 important	 information	 in	 explaining	 the	 relationship	 between	
monetary	 factors,	 industrial	 demand,	 and	 commodity	 prices,	 and	 they	 should	 be	 included	 in	
analyses	that	claim	to	come	from	a	“global”	perspective.	 	 If	the	empirical	results	between	the	two	
samples	are	noticeably	different,	 then	studies	 that	use	only	ADV	 leave	out	 important	 information	
regarding	the	economic	behavior	of	emerging	market	economies.1		
It	may	be	that	what	matters	 for	economic	variables	 influenced	by	monetary	 factors	 is	not	
necessarily	 expected	movements	 in	 interest	 rates	 or	 the	money	 supply	 but	 rather	 “surprises”	 or	
shocks	 in	 the	 financial	 system.	 	Kuttner	 (2001),	using	 the	difference	between	 the	actual	 effective	
federal	 funds	 rate	 and	 that	 predicted	 by	 the	 federal	 funds	 rate	 future	market	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 an	
unexpected	shock,	finds	that	expected	rate	movements	have	minimal	impacts	on	short‐term	bonds,	
while	 unexpected	movements	 are	 robustly	 correlated.	 	 Several	 analyses	 discussed	 in	 Section	 III	
revolve	around	the	impact	that	monetary	shocks	have	on	commodity	prices.	 	Results	presented	in	
this	paper	mostly	 revolve	around	monetary	 shocks	as	well.	 	 These	 shocks	are	 examined	 through	
impulse	 response	 functions	 and	 variance	 decompositions	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 relationships	
determined	by	Granger	causality	tests.		
Results	suggest	that	past	output	(proxied	by	GDP)	is	the	only	robust	predictor	of	commodity	
prices,	while	a	commodity	price	index	is	a	predictor	of	consumer	prices	only	for	the	ADV	and	not	
the	 ALL	 sample;	 this	 situation	 is	 the	 same	 for	 the	 response	 of	 consumer	 prices	 to	 shocks	 to	
commodity	prices.	 	Shocks	to	excess	liquidity	positively	impact	commodity	prices	in	both	samples	
but	 at	 different	 time	 frames,	 reinforcing	 previous	 research	 on	 global	 liquidity.	 	 Shocks	 to	 GDP	
positively	 impact	 commodity	 prices	 in	 both	 samples,	 which	 supports	 the	 “demand	 channel”	
explanations	for	price	inflation.		Interestingly,	in	the	ADV	sample	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	explain	
a	 much	 smaller	 percentage	 of	 the	 variance	 compared	 to	 shocks	 to	 GDP,	 suggesting	 output	
fluctuations	 are	more	 important.	 	 However,	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample,	 after	 two	 years	 shocks	 to	 excess	
liquidity	explain	 twice	as	much	of	 the	variance	 in	 commodity	prices	 compared	 to	 shocks	 to	GDP.		
This	result	suggests	that	monetary	factors	 in	emerging	markets	provide	important	 information	 in	
                                                            
1   Alternatively, one could estimate a VAR with 9 endogenous variables (a set of four macro variables with 
averaged advanced‐country data, a set of four macro variables with averaged BRIC‐country data, and the 
commodity price index). This might be able to separate the impacts of the advanced and BRIC country economies. 
However, doing so would greatly reduce degrees of freedom in the model. 
4 
 
explaining	commodity	price	movements.		Analyses	that	only	account	for	advanced	economies	may	
overemphasize	the	demand	channel.		Despite	the	theory	of	Frankel	(1986)	and	the	results	of	other	
VAR/VEC	analyses,	the	short‐term	interest	rate	does	not	robustly	explain	commodity	prices.	
Since	 these	 results	 reinforce	 the	past	 literature	on	global	 liquidity	and	commodity	prices,	
monetary	policy	makers	should	consider	looking	towards	controlling	excess	money	supply	growth	
if	 they	 wish	 to	 curb	 commodity	 price	 growth.	 	 Additionally,	 if	 coordinated	 monetary	 policy	 is	
needed	to	curb	commodity	price	inflation,	emerging	market	central	banks	should	be	included	since	
their	money	supplies	are	 important	 factors	 in	driving	such	price	growth.	 	BRIC	countries	are	not	
just	becoming	powerful	in	terms	of	output	and	industrial	demand,	but	in	terms	of	monetary	policy	
as	well.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 	 Section	 II	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 recent	
commodity	price	trends	and	the	debates	going	on	in	the	media,	government,	and	academia.		Section	
III	discusses	the	previous	academic	literature	surrounding	monetary	factors	and	commodity	prices,	
especially	those	with	a	global‐level	analysis.		Section	IV	outlines	the	model	that	is	to	be	empirically	
tested.		While	Section	V	discusses	the	data	used	and	methods	of	aggregation,	Section	VI	reports	the	
results	of	the	unit	root	and	cointegration	tests.		The	empirical	results	are	presented	in	Section	VII.		
The	paper	concludes	with	a	summary	in	Section	VIII.	
	
II. The	2000s	Commodity	Price	Bubble	and	Recovery	
Debate	still	exists	and	will	 continue	 to	exist	 for	some	time	 in	regards	 to	 the	causes	of	 the	
2000s	commodity	“bubble.”		From	Q4	2001	to	Q2	2008,	the	S&P	GSCI	Commodity	Index	(See	Figure	
1	 in	Appendix	A)	 increased	45.9%	per	year	 for	a	 total	 return	of	498%,	while	excluding	energy	 it	
increased	a	still	respectable	27.5%	per	year	for	a	total	return	of	264%.		Tang	and	Xiong	(2010)	note	
that	the	severe	downturn	in	equity	markets	following	the	US	“dot‐com”	bubble	caused	the	financial	
sector	 to	 look	 to	 other	 asset	 classes.	 	 A	 small	 negative	 correlation	 between	 equities	 and	
commodities	 that	 was	 discovered	 led	 many	 to	 believe	 that	 portfolio	 risk	 could	 be	 reduced	 by	
increasing	the	weighting	of	commodity	futures.		The	introduction	of	several	commodity	exchange‐
traded	funds	(ETFs)	in	the	latter	half	of	the	decade,	backed	by	stores	of	their	respective	underlying	
metal,	 further	 increased	 the	 ease	 in	 which	 commodities	 could	 be	 invested	 (and	 liquidated).		
Commodity	ETFs	also	 introduced	another	demand	channel	 to	compete	with	 the	 industrial	 sector,	
further	putting	upward	pressure	on	price.		While	over	a	decade	ago,	$6	billion	of	institutional	and	
retail	 money	 was	 invested	 in	 non‐oil	 commodities,	 by	 late	 2010,	 this	 grew	 to	 over	 $320	 billion	
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(Economist,	 2010).	 	 As	 investing	 through	 commodity	 indexes	 became	more	 popular,	 commodity	
prices	 became	 increasingly	 correlated	with	 other	 financial	 asset	 classes.	 	 Tang	 and	Xiong	 (2010)	
find	that	futures	prices	of	several	commodities	became	increasingly	correlated	with	the	price	of	oil	
and	 each	 other	 after	 2004	 and	 that	 this	 correlation	was	 stronger	 for	 indexed	 commodities	 than	
those	that	were	not.		In	addition,	in	2008,	when	commodity	prices	experienced	their	peak	and	most	
dramatic	 gains,	 volatility	 in	 prices	 was	 more	 pronounced	 for	 indexed	 commodities	 than	 non‐
indexed	commodities.		During	these	periods,	however,	correlations	among	prices	in	China	remained	
low	and	did	not	change,	suggesting	that	“emerging	market”	demand	growth	may	not	have	been	a	
large	 driver	 of	 price	 growth	 in	 the	 US.	 	 Baffes	 and	Haniotis	 (2010)	 argue	 similarly	 that	 index	
investing	 is	mostly	 to	 blame	 for	 the	 latter	 days	 of	 the	 bubble	 and	 that	 emerging	market	 growth	
explains	relatively	very	little.		
From	Q2	2007	to	Q2	2008,	commodities	exhibited	perhaps	their	most	dramatic	growth,	as	
the	aggregate	index	grew	by	about	60%.		The	spot	price	of	oil	during	that	same	period	grew	by	over	
90%.		Caballero	et	al,	(2008)	argue	that	this	was	a	reaction	to	the	beginning	of	the	world	financial	
crisis	in	early	2007.		As	mortgage	and	other	bonds	became	a	less	lucrative	asset,	emerging	market	
investors	 awash	with	 cash	 from	 economic	 and	 previous	 commodity	 price	 growth	 pumped	more	
money	 into	 commodities	 in	 search	 of	 a	 new	 asset	 class	 with	 which	 to	 store	 their	 wealth.		
Underdeveloped	 financial	 markets	 in	 developing	 countries	 led	 investors	 there	 to	 seek	 returns	
abroad.	 	Although	commodities	were	elevated	by	this	speculative	growth,	once	the	financial	crisis	
spread	into	the	broader	world	economy,	growth	slowed,	and	the	tight	conditions	in	the	commodity	
markets	required	for	a	bubble	eased.		Thus	the	bubble	“popped”	and	the	aggregate	index	collapsed	
64%	from	June	to	December	2008.	
Similar	 to	 growth	 in	 commodity	 prices	 overall,	 oil’s	 incredible	 price	 growth	 during	 2008	
prompted	 a	 disagreement	 among	 many	 analysts.	 	 Some,	 including	 efficient‐market	 proponent	
Burton	 Malkeil,	 thought	 that	 it	 was	 due	 to	 supply	 and	 demand	 fundamentals	 like	 the	 growing	
demand	 in	 emerging	markets,	 supply	disruptions	 in	Nigeria	 and	 the	Middle	East,	 and	 record	 low	
inventories.	 	 Others,	 like	 investor	 George	 Soros,	 noted	 the	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	 amount	 of	
transactions	in	the	commodity	markets	being	undertaken	by	index	investors.		Some	even	noted	that	
by	 June	 2008	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 bull	 market	 in	 oil	 surpassed	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 NASDAQ	 dot‐com	
bubble	 that	burst	 in	2000	(Patterson	and	Stanton,	2008).	 	Khan	(2009)	and	Eckaus	(2008)	argue	
that	 even	 though	 demand	 growth	 proxied	 through	 growth	 in	 GDP	 worldwide	 would	 be	 a	 valid	
explanation	 for	 commodity,	 price	 growth	 (especially	 oil),	 rates	 of	 economic	 growth,	 especially	 in	
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emerging	markets,	were	not	at	rates	to	justify	the	rapid	price	increases	in	the	2007	and	2008.	 	In	
fact,	from	the	middle	of	2007	to	the	middle	of	2008,	oil	production	rose,	and	consumption	fell.	
After	 the	 collapse	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 late	 2008	 and	 after	 the	 recession	 worldwide	
generally	 abated	 in	 2009,	 prices	 bounced	 back.	 	 From	 December	 2008	 to	 the	 end	 of	 2010,	 the	
commodity	 index	 almost	 doubled.	 	 This	 rapid	 commodity	 price	 growth	 coinciding	 with	 laggard	
growth	in	the	developed	world	left	many	wondering	whether	it	was	attributed	to	robust	growth	in	
emerging	markets	and	the	developing	world,	ultra‐loose	monetary	policy	worldwide,	or	both.			
The	Federal	Reserve’s	 second	round	of	quantitative	easing	 (QE2)	and	other	expansionary	
worldwide	monetary	stances	have	been	blamed	for	the	upward	trend	in	several	metals	prices	in	the	
latter	half	 of	 2010	and	 first	 half	 of	 2011.	 	 In	 fact,	 one	of	 the	 stated	 goals	 of	 the	 second	 round	of	
quantitative	 easing	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 besides	 loosening	 credit	 markets,	 was	 to	 inflate	
financial	 assets	 such	 as	 stocks	 in	 order	 to	 make	 American	 consumers	 feel	 wealthier	 and	 more	
willing	 to	 spend,	 thereby	 positively	 impacting	 output	 (Barone	 2011).	 	 The	 timing	 of	 	 the	 QE2		
coincided	 with	 subsequent	 increases	 in	 prices	 for	 Copper,	 Aluminum,	 Nickel,	 Zinc,	 and	 Lead.		
However,	the	Economist	(R.A.,	2010)	notes	that	the	beginning	of	this	upward	trend	started	in	July	
before	 the	QE2	announcement	and	coincided	with	a	reversal	of	some	growth‐dampening	policies	
that	 the	 Chinese	 government	 had	 previously	 implemented.	 	 Considering	 that	 China	 is	 one	 of	 the	
largest	consumers	of	these	metals,	this	factor	should	surely	be	a	contender	in	explaining	the	price	
growth.	
As	2011	came,	several	central	banks	outside	of	 the	US,	 like	the	ECB	and	emerging	market	
banks,	 began	 to	 tighten	 their	monetary	policy	 and	 criticize	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	 relatively	 loose	
stance,	and	accusing	it	of	liquidity	spillovers	into	their	markets.		Roubini	(2011)	expressed	concern	
that	rising	oil	and	other	commodity	prices	are	a	result	of	a	“…wall	of	 liquidity	chasing	assets	and	
commodities	 in	 emerging	 markets,	 owing	 to	 near‐zero	 interest	 rates	 and	 quantitative	 easing	 in	
advanced	 economies.”	 	 This	 has	 a	 destabilizing	 effect	 on	 poor	 countries	 since	 up	 to	 2/3	 of	
consumption	is	tied	to	oil	or	food,	and	Roubini	suspects	that	this	played	a	major	part	in	the	“Arab	
Spring”	where	popular	uprisings	began	in	several	Middle	Eastern	countries	in	Spring	2011	(Roubini	
2011).		Looking	back	to	the	2000s	commodity	bubble,	the	UN’s	Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	
estimated	that	the	run‐up	in	food	prices	in	2008	drove	an	extra	75	million	people	into	hunger	and	
led	to	riots	in	34	countries	(Katz	and	Levy	2008).		Responding	to	criticisms	of	Fed	policy,	Chairman		
Bernanke	 blamed	 commodity	 inflation	 in	 emerging	 markets	 on	 their	 own	 central	 banks’	
undisciplined	policy	stances	(Derby	2011).	
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III. Literature	Review	
Many	of	the	concerns	cited	in	the	popular	media	provide	some	direction	in	determining	the	
problem	 to	 be	 examined	 and	 the	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	 in	 this	 paper.	 	 Nonetheless,	 economic	
theory	and	 rigorous	 statistical	 analysis	have	also	 suggested	a	 link	between	monetary	 factors	and	
commodity	prices.	
A	 discussion	 of	 this	 relationship	 can	 begin	with	 the	 theoretical	model	 of	 Frankel	 (1986).		
This	model	is	similar	to	the	“overshooting”	model	of	Dornbusch	(1976)	that	describes	the	short‐run	
overreaction	of	exchange	rates	to	money	supply	growth	in	the	face	of	“sticky”	manufacturing	and	
consumer	 prices.	 	 Frankel	 replaces	 exchange	 rates	 with	 commodity	 prices	 and	 suggests	 that	
although	 commodity	prices	 adjust	 to	 a	magnitude	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	movement	 in	 the	money	
supply,	prices	overshoot	in	the	short	run	before	adjusting	back	to	their	long‐run	equilibrium.		This	
holds	whether	 interest	 rates	or	 the	money	 supply	 are	 targeted	 since	both	affect	 the	 real	 interest	
rate.	 	 Frankel	 (2008)	 further	 theorizes	 that	 lowering	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	 increases	 the	 overall	
price	 of	 commodities	 through	 three	 channels	 –	 supply,	 inventory,	 and	 financial.	 Frankel	 (2008)	
finds	that	each	one	percentage	point	decrease	in	the	interest	rate	is	associated	with	a	4‐6%	increase	
in	commodity	prices.	
	 Although	Frankel	acknowledges	the	instability	of	the	model	(the	relationship	is	found	not	to	
hold	after	1980),	this	problem	is	not	addressed	further.	 	 In	addition,	the	issues	of	nonstationarity	
are	ignored,	bringing	the	results	into	question.		Thompson	and	Summers	(2010)	take	up	this	issue	
by	 testing	 for	 and	 finding	 evidence	 of	 nonstationarity	 in	 the	 price	 series.	 	 In	 addition,	 they	 find	
evidence	of	a	structural	break	in	1985.		Although	before	the	date,	a	one‐percentage	point	decrease	
in	the	interest	rate	is	associated	with	a	5.2	percent	increase	in	the	price	index,	after	1985	they	find	
that	 it	 is	associated	with	a	7	percent	decrease.	 	 Similar	 structural	breaks	are	 found	 for	 individual	
commodities	as	well.		Clearly,	there	must	be	other	factors	omitted	from	the	model	that	can	explain	
variation	in	price.	
Besides	 the	 interest	 rate,	 shocks	 to	 the	money	 supply	 have	 been	 found	 to	 relatively	 and	
temporarily	increase	agricultural	prices	both	in	the	US	(Lapp	(1990))	and	New	Zealand		(Robertson	
and	Orden	 (1990)).	 	 In	addition,	using	a	VEC	model,	 Saghaian,	Reed,	 and	Marchant	 (2002)	 found	
evidence	to	support	overshooting	of	agricultural	prices	in	response	to	monetary	shocks	and	a	lack	
of	 long‐run	 money	 neutrality	 due	 to	 the	 unequal	 increases	 of	 prices	 and	 the	 money	 supply.		
However,	 a	 retesting	 of	 several	 previous	 VAR	models	 by	 Isaac	 and	 Rapach	 (1997)	with	 US	 data	
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found	 that	 extending	 the	 sample	 periods	 with	 more	 recent	 data	 produced	 insignificant	
relationships	between	monetary	shocks	and	farm	prices.		
As	stated	before,	one	explanation	 for	 the	2000s	commodity	price	bubble	 is	 that	economic	
growth	(the	so	called	“demand	channel”),	especially	from	resource‐hungry	emerging	markets,	and	
not	loose	monetary	policy	was	the	primary	driver.	 	As	Hua	(1998)	argues,	increases	in	output	are	
associated	with	increases	in	industrial	production,	and,	all	else	equal,	this	will	boost	demand	of	raw	
materials	 in	 the	 form	of	 commodities.	 	 In	addition,	 increases	 in	output	 translate	 into	 increases	 in	
income,	which	should	boost	demand	for	energy	and	food	as	consumer	goods.		Both	Hua	(1998)	and	
Swaray	 (2008)	 estimate	 error‐correction	 models	 (ECM)	 that	 confirm	 this	 relationship	 between	
commodity	 prices	 and	 the	 aggregated	 output	 of	 22	 industrialized	 countries.	 	 In	 addition,	 Hua	
(1998)	finds	that	commodity	prices	respond	negatively	to	increases	in	LIBOR	from	2	to	6	quarters	
after.	
Reflecting	 the	 endogeneity	 issues	 inherent	 in	 examinations	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
macroeconomic,	especially	monetary	policy,	variables,	numerous	authors	have	used	VARs	in	order	
to	analyze	the	impact	of	fluctuations	of	the	monetary	on	other	macroeconomic	outcomes.		Anzuini	
et	al	(2010)	estimate	a	restricted	VAR	for	the	US	economy.		A	positive	one‐percentage	point	shock	
to	the	federal	funds	rate	is	estimated	to	increase	commodity	prices	by	about	5.6%	after	3	months.		
Testing	 different	 identification	 schemes	 and	 sub‐indices	 support	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 analysis.		
However,	 the	 influence	 of	 a	monetary	 shock	 over	 the	 long	 term	 is	 limited	 compared	with	 other	
factors.	 	 They	 also	 find	 evidence	 that	 channels	 identified	 by	 Frankel	 (2008)	 (oil	 inventories,	
supplies,	and	futures	positions)	may	be	significant	in	linking	monetary	growth	to	commodity	prices,	
but	 their	 impact	 is	 extremely	 small,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 indirect	 channel	 of	 increased	 economic	
growth	and	consumer	inflation	plays	a	much	larger	role	in	affecting	commodity	prices	as	a	result	of	
a	monetary	shock.	
	 Analyses	 of	 global	 liquidity	 aggregates	 enable	 a	 search	 for	 relationships	 between	 excess	
liquidity	 and	 globally	 influenced	 variables,	 such	 as	 commodity	 prices.	 	 In	 addition,	 international	
markets	 are	 so	 integrated	 today	 that	 the	 free	 flow	of	 capital	 across	 borders	 undoubtedly	 has	 an	
effect	on	domestic	variables.		Baks	and	Kramer	(1999)	analyze	a	weighted	average	global	real	stock	
return	against	global	variables.		Their	results	suggest	that	excess	global	money	growth	lagged	one	
quarter	 has	 a	 positive	 and	 significant	 effect	 on	 real	 stock	 returns	 and	 that	 Japanese	 monetary	
growth	spills	over	into	global	asset	markets.			
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Sousa	 and	 Zaghini	 (2004)	 use	 a	 structural	 VAR	 (SVAR)	 to	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 foreign	
money	or	“global	liquidity”	on	the	euro	zone	with	particular	emphasis	on	the	transmission	of	global	
shocks.	 	The	result	of	a	positive	global	 liquidity	shock	 is	similar	 to	what	one	would	expect	would	
happen	to	output	and	prices	in	light	of	a	shock	to	a	domestic	monetary	base:		output,	the	domestic	
monetary	base,	and	the	price	level	all	rise.		In	addition,	the	short‐term	rate	eventually	rises,	perhaps	
reflecting	a	 reaction	 to	 increased	 liquidity	by	 the	central	bank.	 	Variance	decomposition	suggests	
that	 global	 liquidity	 plays	 the	most	 important	 role	 in	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 price	 level	 over	 longer	
horizons.			
Rüffer	and	Stracca	(2006)	analyze	domestic	outcomes	and	an	aggregated	global	measure	of	
output	and	prices.		Their	global	liquidity	proxy	is	a	weighted	sum	of	monetary	aggregates	from	the	
US,	UK,	 Japan,	and	Canada	divided	by	an	aggregate	of	output	 in	order	to	account	for	expansion	of	
global	 liquidity	 not	 accounted	 for	 by	 expansion	 of	 global	 output	 (“excess	money”).	 	 A	 real	 asset	
price	does	not	respond	positively	to	excess	money	but	does	have	an	inverse	relationship	with	the	
interest	rate	in	a	global	aggregate.	 	The	response	to	Japanese,	Canadian,	and	euro	zone	prices	and	
output	to	an	excess	global	money	shock	is	similar	to	that	found	by	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004),	but	
the	US	seems	unaffected	by	global	shocks,	apart	 from	consumer	prices.	 	Only	 in	the	euro	zone	do	
asset	prices	increase	as	a	result	of	a	positive	shock	to	excess	money.	
	 Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 find	 that	 deviation	 of	 commodity	 prices	 from	 consumer	 prices	 is	
positively	related	 to	excess	global	money	growth	and	negatively	related	 to	 the	 interest	rate.	 	The	
long‐run	 relationship	 they	 find	 between	 commodity	 and	 consumer	 prices	 suggests	 that	 any	
commodity	price	inflation	will	have	spillovers	in	consumer	prices	as	well.	
Turning	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 commodity	 price	 shocks,	 Sousa	 and	 Zaghini	 (2006)	 find	 that	
positive	commodity	price	shocks	appear	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	global	output	and	a	positive	
impact	on	global	consumer	prices.	 	After	two	years,	commodity	prices	explain	a	growing	share	of	
the	variation	in	both	output	and	prices.	 	Shocks	to	domestic	variables	perform	similarly	except	 in	
some	cases	for	the	US.		This	suggests	that	not	only	does	the	impact	of	money	on	domestic	variables	
not	differ	significantly	between	countries,	but	also,	central	bank	strategies	may	be	similar.	
	
IV.	 Model	
The	endogenous	variables	included	in	the	system	follows	that	of	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	
2006)	 and	 Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010),	which	 are	 focused	 specifically	 on	 commodity	 prices	 and	 globally	
aggregated	variables.		These	are,	with	their	variable	names	in	parentheses,	output	(GDP),	consumer	
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price	level	(CPI),	excess	liquidity	(MON),	interest	rate	(INT),	and	commodity	prices	(COM).	 	These	
variables	capture	three	main	markets:	the	goods,	money,	and	raw	materials	markets.	 	Commodity	
prices	are	the	focus	of	this	analysis,	but	it	is	also	of	secondary	interest	to	see	whether	commodity	
prices	 influence	 consumer	prices.	 	 Inflation	 can	 impact	output	while	prompting	policy	makers	 to	
raise	 interest	 rates	 and	 contract	 the	money	 supply.	 	 Including	 a	measure	 of	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	
system	 draws	 upon	 the	 theory	 of	 Frankel	 (1986)	 that	 predicts	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	
interest	rates	and	commodity	prices.			
Output	 level	 is	 closely	 correlated	with	 industrial	 production	 levels	 and	 can	be	 taken	 as	 a	
measure	of	demand	 for	 raw	materials	 (commodities).	 	A	possibly	better	alternative	 to	using	GDP	
would	be	to	use	an	Industrial	Production	index,	but	these	data	were	not	available	for	all	countries	
in	 the	 sample.	 	 Testing	 the	 response	 of	 commodity	 prices	 to	 output	 fluctuations	 can	 help	 to	
determine	how	important	the	demand	channel	is	to	explaining	the	variation	in	commodity	prices.		If	
the	demand	channel	is	found	to	explain	more	of	the	variation	in	prices	than	monetary	factors,	this	
would	 not	 necessarily	 provide	 a	 strong	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 theory	 that	 the	 acceleration	 in	
commodity	 prices	 from	mid‐2007	 to	mid‐2008	was	mostly	 attributable	 to	 demand.	 	 However,	 it	
would	suggest	that	demand	is	a	more	important	determinant	overall,	especially	for	the	long‐term	
appreciation	in	prices	over	the	2000s	decade.	
Finally,	 excess	 liquidity	 is	 another	monetary	 indicator	 that	 can	 convey	 information	 about	
liquidity	 in	 the	 financial	 system	 that	 interest	 rates	 cannot.	 	 For	 example,	 after	 the	2008	 financial	
crisis,	 interest	 rates	 have	 remained	near	 zero	 in	 the	US	 and	will	 do	 so	 for	 an	 “extended	period.”		
During	 this	 time,	however,	 the	Federal	Reserve	has	 injected	 liquidity	 into	 the	 system	 through	 its	
quantitative	easing	programs	involving	purchases	of	mortgage	and	long‐term	treasury	debt,	which	
is	meant	 to	 impact	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 short‐term	 rates.	 	 By	 examining	 the	 size	 of	 the	money	
supply	 relative	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 economy	 through	 an	 excess	 liquidity	 indicator,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
account	 for	 liquidity	 that	may	be	 in	excess	of	 that	required	to	accommodate	output.	 	This	surplus	
money	 may	 be	 directed	 into	 the	 financial	 markets	 where	 it	 may	 find	 its	 way	 into	 propping	 up	
commodity	prices.	
Despite	the	similarity	between	the	model	in	this	paper	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006)	
and	 Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010),	 models	 used	 by	 those	 authors	 are	 structural	 VARs,	 which	 impose	
restrictions	 on	 the	 contemporaneous	 effects	 of	 certain	 endogenous	 variables	 on	 others	 in	 the	
system.		Using	a	restricted	VAR	would	allow	the	theory	to	more	easily	shape	the	empirical	model,	
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based	on	the	restrictions	chosen	by	the	researcher.		To	simplify	the	analysis	instead,	the	VAR	used	
in	this	paper	is	unrestricted.	
The	ordering	scheme	follows	that	of	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2006):	first	is	output,	then	the	price	
level,	excess	liquidity,	the	interest	rate,	and	commodity	prices	(in	order:	GDP,	CPI,	MON,	INT,	COM).		
Most	importantly,	commodity	prices	are	ordered	last,	because	they	are	supposed	to	represent	the	
reaction	 to	 fluctuation	 in	 the	 other	macroeconomic	 variables	 in	 the	 system,	 both	monetary	 and	
demand‐based.			
	 Granger	causality	tests,	impulse	response	functions,	and	variance	decompositions	are	used	
to	 analyze	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 endogenous	 variables	 in	 the	 system.	 	 The	 latter	 two	
examine	the	effect	that	a	shock	to	one	variable	has	on	the	others	in	the	system.		Shocks	to	monetary	
variables	 (in	 this	 case	 excess	 liquidity	 and	 short‐term	 interest	 rates2)	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 three	
possible	sources	(see	Li,	Işcan	and	Xu,	2010).	 	First,	“exogenous	policy	shocks”	are	changes	to	the	
goals	and	targets	(unemployment,	 inflation,	 financial	stability,	exchange	rates)	of	central	bankers.		
Second,	 economic	 agents	may	 change	 their	 inflationary	 expectations	 not	 according	 to	 “economic	
fundamentals,”	which	 can	 cause	policy	 changes.	 	Third,	measurement	 error	of	 real‐time	data	 can	
cause	errors	in	policymaking.		Shocks	in	the	context	of	this	analysis	are	not	defined	as	clearly,	since	
central	 banks	 do	 not	 respond	 in	 the	 same	 way	 to	 the	 same	 macroeconomic	 fluctuations.	 	 In	
addition,	monetary	policy	differs	across	countries	since	financial	and	economic	performance	at	any	
moment	in	time	in	each	country	differs.		Therefore,	shocks	to	the	global	monetary	variables	reflect	a	
generalized	worldwide	monetary	policy	stance,	rather	than	some	sort	of	coordinated	policy.	
	
IV. Data	and	Aggregation	Methodology	
Data	were	 gathered	 from	 IMF’s	 International	 Financial	 Statistics,	 OECD‐Stat,	World	 Bank	
Development	 Indicators,	 the	 Area	 Wide	 Model	 (AWM)	 dataset	 from	 the	 Euro	 Business	 Cycle	
Network,	Eurostat,	and	Bloomberg.		Data	from	these	sources	is	available	quarterly	at	best,	so	this	is	
the	frequency	of	the	data.	 	Most	of	the	data	was	extracted	from	the	IMF,	but	there	are	gaps	in	the	
data	series	that	are	extrapolated	by	using	the	growth	rate	of	a	similar	variable	or	the	same	variable	
from	a	different	source.		For	example	the	AWM	short‐term	interest	rate	is	used	for	the	short‐term	
interest	rate	for	the	euro	zone,	but	after	Q4	2009,	the	growth	rate	of	the	EURIBOR	interest	rate	is	
                                                            
2 Some central banks (e.g. the Federal Reserve) do not target the money supply per se, but it is an important 
indicator that helps to shape policy and central banks can choose to expand or contract it through traditional open 
market operations, changing the discount rate or the interest paid on excess reserves, quantitative easing, etc.   
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used	to	extrapolate	to	Q3	2010	since	AWM	data	is	only	available	until	Q4	2009.		More	information	
on	how	each	specific	gap	in	the	data	was	filled	is	available	upon	request.	
Every	effort	is	made	to	estimate	a	model	using	the	most	up‐to‐date	data	so	that	the	strong	
commodity	price	growth	in	2009	and	2010	could	be	captured	in	addition	to	the	price	growth	during	
the	 2000s	 “bubble.”	 	 The	 furthest	 that	 data	 goes	 back	 for	 all	 of	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 without	
sacrificing	 data	 quality	 is	 Q2	 1995.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 ALL	 sample	 starts	 at	 this	 date	 due	 to	 data	
availability.	 	 Data	 from	 the	 advanced	 countries	 is	 available	 back	 to	 the	 early	 1980s,	 providing	 a	
large	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	and	the	opportunity	to	examine	the	ADV	sample	over	the	entire	
“post‐Volcker”	era.	 	Unfortunately,	when	testing	this	sample	for	cointegration	using	the	Johansen‐
Juselius	method,	the	test	reports	that	five	cointegrating	vectors	existed.		Since	the	system	is	made	of	
up	 of	 five	 endogenous	 variables,	 a	 result	 that	 implies	 five	 cointegrating	 vectors	 suggest	 that	 the	
model	might	be	misspecified.	 	When	restricting	this	sample	to	the	same	period	of	the	ALL	sample	
this	 result	 disappears,	 and	 no	misspecification	 is	 suggested.3	 	 Therefore,	 both	 the	 ADV	 and	 ALL	
samples	will	be	estimated	from	Q2	1995	to	Q3	2010.	
Table	1	(all	tables	and	figures	are	provided	in	Appendix	A)	displays	the	shares	of	world	or	
OECD	GDP	(adjusted	for	PPP	in	current	US	$)	that	each	sample	represents,	 from	the	beginning	of	
the	 sample	 period	 to	 the	 end,	 in	 addition	 to	 showing	 the	 rising	 share	 that	BRIC	 countries	 have.4		
Notice	 that	 the	 ADV	 sample	 represents	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 OECD	 output,	 suggesting	 that	 the	
countries	in	the	ADV	sample	account	for	most	of	the	output	from	what	are	considered	the	richest	
and	most	economically	powerful	countries	in	the	world.		However,	the	ADV’s	sample	as	a	share	of	
world	output	dropped	by	 eleven	percentage	points	 over	 the	 15‐year	period.	 	 This	 can	mostly	be	
accounted	 for	 in	 the	 nine‐percentage	 point	 gain	 in	world	 output	 share	 experienced	 by	 the	 BRIC	
countries,	 indicating	 that	 they	 are	 now	 much	 more	 economically	 powerful	 than	 in	 years	 past.		
Therefore,	previous	 studies	whose	 samples	 claimed	 to	 represent	a	 “global”	 aggregate	yet	 left	out	
the	 BRIC	 countries	may	 have	missed	 the	 growing	 ability	 of	 these	 countries	 to	 have	 a	 significant	
effect	on	commodity	prices.			
                                                            
3 Originally, an ADV sample restricted to the same period as the ALL sample was going to be estimated anyway in 
addition to the ADV sample going back to 1980. 
4  In the ADV sample representing the most  important advanced economies, 10 countries and the euro zone are 
aggregated which include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, 
and  the US.   These are  the countries  selected by Belke et. al.  (2010) because  they  represented a  large enough 
share of world GDP and an even larger share of world financial markets.  The ALL sample includes every country in 
the ADV sample and the four BRIC countries.   
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The	 fact	 that	 the	share	 lost	by	 the	ADV	sample	was	mostly	picked	up	by	the	BRIC	sample	
indicates	 that	 the	 non‐ADV,	 non‐BRIC	 countries’	 share	 of	 world	 output	 remained	 relatively	
constant.	 	These	remaining	countries	as	a	whole	did	not	rise	 in	relative	economic	power	over	the	
sample	period.		In	addition	data	for	much	of	the	developing	world	is	either	not	available,	especially	
at	quarterly	 frequency,	 or	 its	quality	 and	 comparability	 is	highly	 suspect.	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	
ALL	sample	is	assumed	the	best	representation	of	“global”	variables	with	data	available.	
One	 important	 caveat	 to	 consider	 in	 this	 global	 aggregation	 is	 that	 definitions	 for	
macroeconomic	variables	differ	across	countries.		For	short‐term	interest	rates	a	large	majority	of	
rates	used	are	a	3‐month	treasury	bill	rate,	but	such	rates	may	not	be	available	for	some	countries	
or	clearly	indicated,	so	the	interest	rate	closest	to	a	“short‐term	interest	rate”	is	used.		This	is	not	a	
large	problem	if	one	assumes	that	the	short‐term	rate	used	would	move	in	a	similar	fashion	to	that	
country’s	hypothetical	3‐month	treasury	bill	rate.		However,	it	might	be	a	problem	for	the	measure	
of	 excess	 liquidity.	 	 Different	 countries	 have	 different	 definitions	 of	 broad	 money,	 and	 not	 all	
countries	track	the	same	monetary	aggregates	(e.g.	not	all	countries	in	the	sample	track	and	report	
M2).	 	 Hypothetically,	 the	 broad	 money	 of	 country	 1	 might	 include	 all	 of	 the	 different	 types	 of	
accounts	 and	 assets	 as	 country	 2	 in	 equal	 amounts,	 but	 it	 might	 include,	 say,	 repurchase	
agreements	as	well.		If	the	two	countries’	economies	are	of	equal	size,	then	excess	liquidity	measure	
of	country	1	would	be	higher	than	country	2	solely	because	of	the	difference	in	definitions.	
	 Despite	 these	 unharmonized	 definitions,	 this	 method	 retains	 some	 merit.	 	 First,	 taking	
global	money	supply	and	dividing	 it	by	global	output	 is	arithmetically	 the	same	as	 taking	a	GDP‐
weighted	average	of	each	country’s	excess	 liquidity	variable.	 	Second,	 the	broad	money	definition	
chosen	 for	 each	 country	 is	 assumed	 the	money	 indicator	monitored	 by	 the	 country’s	 respective	
central	bank.		For	example,	when	the	Federal	Reserve	directs	US	monetary	policy,	it	considers	M2	
when	 it	 gauges	movements	 in	 US	 broad	money.	 	 The	 Bank	 of	 England	 tracks	 the	 UK’s	M4	 even	
though	its	definition	differs	from	M2.		Therefore,	what	would	be	considered	excess	liquidity	to	one	
central	bank	might	not	be	considered	excess	liquidity	to	another.		If	it	is	assumed	from	the	results	of	
this	 paper	 that	 policy	 should	 be	 shaped	 around	 movements	 in	 excess	 liquidity,	 a	 central	 bank	
cannot	respond	to	movements	in	a	broad	money	definition	that	it	does	not	closely	track.		Therefore,	
it	 is	 assumed	 that	 unharmonized	 definitions	will	 work	well	 enough	 as	 proxies	 for	 global	 excess	
liquidity,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 worth	 going	 through	 the	 trouble	 and	 possible	 measurement	 error	 of	
attempting	to	construct	broad	money	aggregates	with	harmonized	definitions.	
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	 As	far	as	the	specific	data	used	for	each	of	the	variables	in	the	model	is	concerned,	real	GDP	
transformed	into	US	dollars	using	PPP	exchange	rates	is	used	for	output.		GDP	not	only	represents	a	
measure	 of	 industrial	 activity	 that	 suggests	 a	 degree	 of	 demand	 for	 commodities,	 but	 it	 also	 is	 a	
measure	of	the	size	of	an	economy	and	the	degree	of	economic	power	and	influence	that	a	country	
can	wield.	 	Therefore	GDP	weights	 are	used	 to	weight	 the	globally	 aggregated	averages.	 	 For	 the	
price	level,	CPI	is	used.		Although	the	CPI	does	have	its	flaws	as	a	measure	of	price,5	it	is	the	most	
widely	tracked	measure	of	inflation,	and	it	is	readily	available	for	all	of	the	countries	in	the	samples.		
As	 stated	 before,	 excess	 liquidity	 is	 measured	 by	 taking	 the	 sum	 of	 all	 countries’	 broad	 money	
measures	and	dividing	it	by	the	sum	of	GDPs.		As	Rüffer	and	Stracca	(2006)	argue,	the	behavior	of	
monetary	 aggregates	 “may	 reflect	 not	 only	 contemporaneous	 output,	 price	 and	 interest	 rate	
developments,	but	also	a	‘spectrum	of	yields’	on	a	number	of	financial	and	real	assets.”	The	excess	
liquidity	 indicator	purges	the	effects	of	nominal	spending	(nominal	GDP)	and	the	 interest	rate	on	
money	demand	and	could	serve	as	a	proxy	for	a	“spectrum	of	yields”	in	the	financial	world	which	
might	matter	for	inflationary	pressure.		For	the	interest	rate,	a	short‐term	nominal	interest	rate	that	
is	most	similar	to	a	3‐month	treasury	bill	is	used.		This	is	done	in	order	to	select	a	rate	over	which	a	
central	bank	has	some	degree	of	control;	in	effect,	this	is	supposed	to	mirror	a	policy	rate.			
The	commodity	price	 index	used	 is	 the	S&P	GSCI.	 	According	 to	Standard	and	Poor’s,	 “the	
index	 is	 calculated	 primarily	 on	 a	 world	 production‐weighted	 basis	 and	 is	 comprised	 of	 the	
principal	 physical	 commodities	 that	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 active,	 liquid	 futures	 markets.”6	 	 Energy	
commodities	 account	 for	66.5%	of	 the	weighting.	 	A	broad	 commodity	 index	 is	used,	because,	 as	
Belke	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 explain,	 “an	 advantage	 of	 using	 indices	 of	 commodity	 groups	 rather	 than	
individual	 commodity	 prices	 is	 that	 idiosyncratic	 factors	 impacting	 on	 individual	 commodity	
markets	should	have	far	less	influence	at	the	level	of	a	multi‐commodity,	broadly‐based	index.”			
Oil	 itself	 is	probably	the	commodity	most	widely	tracked	by	the	broad	economy	and	most	
susceptible	to	broad	economic	fluctuations.		Oil	also	can	have	a	direct	impact	on	the	real	economy,	
as	 it	 is	 such	 a	 vital	 fuel	 for	 business	 and	 consumer	 activity.	 	 Therefore,	 including	 oil	 in	 a	 broad	
commodity	index	may	produce	empirical	results	that	are	unable	to	be	generalized	to	commodities	
as	a	whole,	 since	 the	effect	of	oil	may	dominate	over	 the	other	components.	 	However,	using	 the	
Johansen	–Juselius	cointegration	test,	Swaray	(2008)	finds	that	oil	and	non‐fuel	commodities	move	
                                                            
5 In fact, the Federal Reserve now uses the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index to make policy 
decisions and relies less on the CPI. 
6 http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp‐gsci/en/us/?indexId=spgscirg‐‐usd‐‐‐‐sp‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
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in	 tandem.	 	 In	 fact,	modern	 farming	 and	mining	 and	other	 raw	material	 procurement	 requires	 a	
significant	 energy	 input.	 	 Rising	 energy	 prices,	 oil	 specifically,	 raises	 the	 costs	 of	 commodity	
extraction,	thus	pushing	up	the	price	of	commodities.		Due	to	this	assumed	correlation	between	oil	
and	other	commodities,	an	index	encompassing	energy	and	non‐energy	commodity	prices	is	used.7	
All	variables	except	the	interest	rate	are	expressed	in	log	form.	 	Where	individual	country	
GDP,	 CPI,	 and	 broad	 money	 measures	 are	 not	 extracted	 from	 their	 sources	 already	 seasonally	
adjusted,	they	are	adjusted	with	the	X12‐ARIMA	method.		The	specific	macroeconomic	data	series	
chosen	roughly	follows	the	convention	used	in	the	previous	literature	on	globally	aggregated	data	
and	VARs.	 	Besides	 the	 excess	 liquidity	 indicator,	 real	GDP	 is	used	by	Rüffer	 and	Stracca	 (2006),	
Baks,	Kramer	(1999),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006);	CPI	is	used	by	Baks,	
Kramer	(1999),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006),	and	Anzuini	et.	al.	(2010).		
A	 short‐term	nominal	 interest	 rate	 (a	3‐month	 treasury	 rate	or	 its	 closest	 equivalent)	 is	used	by	
Rüffer	and	Stracca	(2006),	Baks,	Kramer	(1999),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	
2006).	
For	comparison,	the	aggregated	variables	for	both	the	ALL	and	ADV	samples	are	provided	in	
Figure	1.		GDP	took	a	noticeable	dip	in	1998	for	the	ALL	sample	while	growth	remained	positive	for	
ADV,	possibly	reflecting	the	effects	on	the	BRIC	countries	of	the	Asian	and	Russian	financial	crises	
during	1997‐1998.	 	Beginning	around	2004,	the	gap	between	the	ALL	and	ADV	samples	begins	to	
close,	 reflecting	 the	 higher	 rates	 of	 growth	 that	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 experienced	 relative	 to	 the	
advanced	economies	 through	 to	 the	end	of	 the	sample	period.	 	As	 the	CPI	chart	shows,	when	 the	
inflation	 rates	 of	 the	 BRIC	 countries	 are	 taken	 into	 account,	 the	 global	 price	 level	 has	 risen	 at	 a	
faster	 rate	 compared	 with	 just	 the	 advanced	 countries.	 	 The	 global	 nominal	 interest	 rate	 is	
consistently	higher	for	the	ALL	sample	than	the	ADV	sample,	reflecting	the	higher	inflation	rates	of	
the	ALL	sample.	 	In	particular,	around	1995‐1996,	Russia	experienced	interest	rates	at	the	100%‐
300%	level	as	it	came	off	of	a	period	of	hyperinflation	following	the	breakup	of	the	Soviet	Union.	
The	 comparison	 of	 measures	 of	 excess	 liquidity	 across	 samples	 displays	 a	 peculiar	
divergence	among	 the	 liquidity	positions	of	 the	advanced	and	BRIC	economies.	 	By	 this	measure,	
                                                            
7 The method by which price indexes and interest rates are transformed into global aggregate variables follows the 
methodology of Sousa and Zaghini (2004, 2006) who construct a GDP‐weighted average.  Global output is simply a 
sum of all 15 countries’ GDPs.  However, while Sousa and Zaghini use a weighted average money supply index as 
their measure of liquidity, this paper follows the methodology of Rüffer and Stracca (2006), who use a measure of 
“excess”  liquidity that  is the ratio of the “global” broad money supply  (simple sum) to “global” output.   A more 
detailed explanation of the weighting method is provided in Appendix B. 
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the	BRIC	countries	brought	down	the	average	in	years	prior	to	2001,	suggesting	that	there	was	less	
excess	liquidity	in	the	BRIC	countries	as	a	whole	than	the	advanced	countries.		Both	series	display	a	
clear	upward	trend	throughout	the	whole	sample,	but	after	Q3	2001	excess	liquidity	was	higher	for	
the	ALL	sample	 than	ADV,	 suggesting	 that	money	supplies	 in	 the	BRIC	countries	were	expanding	
above	 and	 beyond	 what	 was	 required	 for	 economic	 growth	 at	 a	 faster	 rate	 than	 the	 advanced	
countries.	 	 The	 point	 at	which	 excess	 liquidity	 for	 the	 ALL	 sample	 became	 higher	 than	 the	 ADV	
sample	also	happened	to	coincide	with	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	commodity	bubble.		This	is	not	to	
suggest	 that	 one	 variable	 caused	 the	 other;	 it	 is	 entirely	 possible	 that	 this	 situation	 is	 purely	 a	
correlation	 and	 that	 the	 two	variables	 are	 both	positively	 affected	by	 a	 third	 variable	 (e.g.	GDP).		
Rather,	 it	 provides	 a	 rationale	 for	 looking	 into	whether	 or	 not	 commodity	 prices	 are	 affected	by	
excess	liquidity	from	BRIC	countries	in	addition	to	the	advanced	economies.		
Finally,	a	constant	is	added	to	the	model,	and,	due	to	the	linear	trend	in	each	data	series	and	
due	to	the	convention	used	by	Rüffer	and	Stracca(2006),	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	and	Sousa	and	Zaghini	
(2004,	2006),	a	linear	trend	is	included	as	well.		In	all	specifications	tested	in	this	paper,	the	trend	
and	 constant	 term	 are	 significant	 in	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 equations	 and	 is	 included	 in	 the	 final	
models.	
	
V. Unit	Root	and	Cointegration	Tests	
Before	estimating	the	model	it	 is	 important	that	the	variables	are	in	stationary	form;	non‐
stationarity	of	macroeconomic	variables	 is	a	classic	problem	in	time‐series	analysis.	 	Estimating	a	
model	with	non‐stationary	variables	could	run	the	risk	of	producing	spurious	correlation.		In	order	
to	detect	non‐stationarity,	 three	different	unit	 root	 tests	are	performed	on	 the	 five	variables:	 the	
Augmented	Dickey‐Fuller	(ADF),	Dickey‐Fuller	GLS	(DF‐GLS),	and	Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–
Shin	(KPSS)	tests.		None	of	the	tests	in	isolation	provide	conclusive	evidence	of	stationarity	or	non‐
stationarity,	 so	 if	 all	 three	 tests	agree	with	each	other,	 then	more	confidence	can	be	given	 to	 the	
result.		
Results	 of	 each	 of	 the	 unit	 root	 tests	 on	 each	 variable	 for	 both	 data	 sets	 are	 provided	 in	
Table	2.	 	 In	general,	 the	tests	suggest	that	the	variables	are	non‐stationary	in	their	 level	 form	but	
stationary	 in	 their	 first‐differences.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 model	 will	 be	 estimated	 using	 the	 first‐
differences.8	
                                                            
8 For the INT variable in the ALL sample, the tests disagreed with each other and with past literature.  The ADF test 
suggested stationarity in 1st differenced form, while the DF‐GLS and KPSS tests both suggested that a unit root 
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Unfortunately,	 estimating	 a	 model	 in	 first‐differences	 focuses	 on	 short‐term	 fluctuations	
and	 tends	 to	 eliminate	 information	 about	 the	 long‐run	 relationships	 between	 the	 variables.		
Ignoring	such	information	could	produce	biased	results	when	one	is	looking	to	examine	structural,	
long‐term	relationships.		However,	if	two	or	more	variables	are	cointegrated	with	each	other,	then	
although	 their	 level	 forms	 might	 be	 non‐stationary,	 there	 may	 exist	 a	 stationary	 relationship	
between	the	cointegrated	level	variables	in	a	long‐run	equilibrium.		Indeed,	in	much	of	the	previous	
literature,	 (see	 Saghaian,	 Reed,	 and	Marchant	 (2002),	 Robertson	 and	Orden	 (1990),	 Hua	 (1998),	
Swaray	 (2008)	 for	 examples),	 macroeconomic	 variables	 were	 cointegrated	 and	 estimated	 with	
models	to	take	this	into	account.	
A	 VEC	 model	 would	 be	 estimated	 similarly	 to	 a	 VAR,	 but	 a	 VEC	 would	 account	 for	 this	
cointegration.	 	With	 a	 VEC	 specification,	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 variables	 are	 assumed	 to	
return	to	a	long‐run	equilibrium	after	a	shock	to	one	or	more	variables.	 	This	way,	the	model	can	
incorporate	 the	 long‐run	 information	 of	 the	 level	 forms	without	 running	 the	 risk	 of	 introducing	
spurious	correlation.		
One	often‐used	method	to	test	for	cointegration	is	the	Johansen‐Juselius	(JJ)	Test.		This	test	
will	report	the	number	of	cointegrating	vectors	that	makes	the	variables	cointegrated,	also	known	
as	 the	rank	of	 the	matrix	of	variables.	 	Since	a	 trend	and	 intercept	 is	apparent	 in	each	series,	 the	
rank	selected	from	the	JJ	Test	will	be	the	test	run	using	a	trend	and	intercept.		In	addition,	the	Trace	
method	is	used	to	determine	the	rank.		
Before	the	JJ	Test	can	be	run,	the	appropriate	lag	length	for	the	VARs	for	each	sample	must	
be	determined.	Lag	 lengths	are	determined	by	using	Final	Prediction	Error,	and	Akaike,	Schwarz,	
and	 Hannan‐Quinn	 information	 criterion,	 which	 mostly	 suggested	 that	 both	 samples	 should	 be	
estimated	at	a	lag	length	of	one.		However,	the	models	were	tested	for	autocorrelation	using	the	LM	
test,	and	the	lag	length	was	increased	an	retested	until	autocorrelation	disappeared.		This	occurred	
at	two	lags	for	the	ADV	sample	and	three	lags	for	the	ALL	sample.		Belke	et.	al.	(2010)	indicate	that	
“In	macroeconomic	modeling	it	is	hard	to	imagine	agents	using	information	that	reaches	back	much	
further	than	two	to	four	quarters,”	and	they	themselves	find	two	quarterly	 lags	to	be	appropriate	
for	their	CVAR	according	to	information	criterion.	
                                                                                                                                                                                               
existed in the level and 1st difference.  Because the other variables are stationary in first‐differences and because 
authors in the previous literature have estimated VARs all in first differences, INT will be estimated in its first 
difference as if it were stationary in that form.  However, the reader should be aware that this variable exhibited 
this peculiar characteristic. It might be worthwile to test for unit roots over a sample period from 1995 Q2 to 2008 
Q3 in order to avoid the structural break that may have occurred during the financial crisis, but this is not pursued.  
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In	both	samples,	the	JJ	Test	suggests	that	cointegration	exists.		However,	in	the	ADV	sample	
the	 Trace	 method	 suggests	 that	 four	 cointegrating	 vectors	 exist,	 while	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample	 three	
cointegrating	vectors	exist.		Therefore,	there	is	a	stationary	long‐run	relationship	between	the	level	
variables	that	are,	by	themselves,	non‐stationary.	
Before	 running	 the	 model	 as	 a	 VEC,	 one	 more	 test	 for	 cointegration	 is	 run	 in	 order	 to	
provide	more	confidence	in	the	results.	 	The	Pesaran	test	from	Pesaran,	Shin,	and	Smith	(2001)	is	
similar	to	the	Trace	method,	but	it	only	tells	whether	or	not	a	stationary	relationship	exists	between	
the	variables	 in	 level	 form	and	not	specifically	how	many	cointegrating	vectors	exist.	 	This	test	 is	
performed	by	 including	 the	 lagged	 level	 forms	of	 the	endogenous	variables	at	a	 lag	 length	 that	 is	
one	period	greater	than	the	furthest	lagged	differenced	variables	in	the	VAR.		In	the	case	of	the	ADV	
sample,	the	level	forms	at	lag	three	are	included,	while	in	the	ALL	sample,	the	forms	at	lag	four	are.		
In	both	samples	each	one	of	the	VAR	equations	is	run	with	the	lagged	level	variables	added,	and	a	
Wald	 test	 is	 performed	 to	 determine	 the	 joint	 significance	 of	 the	 level	 variables.	 	 The	 F‐stat	 is	
compared	with	the	critical	values	given	by	Pesaran,	Shin,	and	Smith	(2001).	 	Table	3	provides	the	
results	of	the	Pesaran	test.	
Only	one	equation	 in	 each	 sample	unambiguously	 suggests	 that	 cointegration	exists.	 	The	
test	 statistic	 for	 the	equation	with	CPI	 as	 the	dependent	variable	 in	 the	ADV	sample	provides	 an	
ambiguous	 result.	 	 Thus,	 there	 is	 mixed	 evidence	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 cointegration,	 despite	 it	
appearing	in	similar	analyses	in	the	literature.		The	JJ	test	suggests	cointegration,	while	the	Pesaran	
test	does	not	 strongly	 suggest	 it.	 	One	 reason	why	 this	mixed	 result	may	exist	 is	 that	 the	 sample	
period	 is	 relatively	 short,	 roughly	 fifteen	 years.	 	 The	 case	 could	 be	made	 that	 that	 is	 not	 a	 long	
enough	period	for	variables	to	display	a	clear	return	to	long‐run	equilibrium	that	could	be	picked	
up	 by	 the	 Pesaran	 test,	 even	 though	 they	 might	 clearly	 display	 cointegration	 if	 the	 sample	 was	
extended.9	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 model	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 structural	 relationships	 between	 these	
variables.		Leaving	these	long‐run	variables	out	could	introduce	bias	causing	a	misinterpretation	of	
these	relationships.		With	that	in	mind,	one	could	argue	that	long‐run	impacts	should	be	controlled	
for	 (i.e.	 cointegration	should	be	assumed)	 if	 their	 inclusion	 improves	 the	 fit	of	 the	overall	model.		
The	Table	 4	 uses	Adjusted‐R2,	 Akaike	 Information	Criterion,	 and	 Schwarz	Criterion,	 as	 gauges	 of	
model	fit.		In	every	situation	(except	the	Schwarz	Criterion	in	the	ALL	sample),	the	model	with	long‐
                                                            
9 See Hakkio and Rush (1991) for a discussion on the long‐run implications of  cointegration. 
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run	 information	 included	(i.e.	 the	VEC	specification10)	 is	a	better	 fit	 for	 the	data.	 	Since	 the	 JJ	 test	
suggests	cointegration,	the	Pesaran	test	does	not	strongly	imply	no	cointegration,	and	the	models	
that	 assume	 cointegration	 are	 a	 better	 fit,	 The	 final	 models	 are	 then	 estimated	 as	 VECs	 which	
included	the	third	and	fourth	lagged	level	variables	in	the	ADV	and	ALL	samples,	respectively.	
	
VI.	 Empirical	Results	
	 From	the	results	of	the	Granger	causality	tests	(Table	5)	using	a	cutoff	of	a	10	percent	level	
of	 significance,	 a	 few	 relevant	 structural	 relationships	 are	 suggested.	 	 In	 the	 ADV	 sample,	
commodity	prices	Granger	cause	GDP	and	CPI,	but	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	ALL	sample.		For	CPI	
especially,	this	is	a	peculiar	result,	since	the	CPIs	in	emerging	countries	are	more	heavily	weighted	
with	commodities	compared	to	advanced	countries.	 	Therefore,	one	would	expect	that	at	the	very	
least	if	commodity	prices	Granger	caused	CPI	in	advanced	countries,	then	it	would	Granger	cause	it	
in	a	sample	that	included	emerging	countries	as	well.	 	Note,	however,	that	CPI	in	the	ADV	sample	
also	Granger	causes	commodity	prices.		
	 In	the	ADV	sample,	CPI	Granger	causes	the	short‐term	interest	rate.		Assuming	that	this	is	a	
positive	relationship,	this	suggests	that	higher	rates	of	 inflation	across	advanced	countries	 induce	
central	banks	to	tighten	monetary	policy	through	interest	rates.	In	the	ALL	sample,	although	each	of	
the	other	four	endogenous	variables	jointly	Granger	cause	the	global	short‐term	interest	rate,	none	
of	 them	 individually	 Granger	 cause	 the	 interest	 rate.	 	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 interest	 rates	 respond	
differently	 to	 economic	 conditions	 between	 advanced	 and	 emerging	 economies	 to	 a	 degree	 that	
makes	aggregation	into	a	single	rate	meaningless	for	global‐level	analysis.	
While	excess	liquidity	(MON)	does	not	appear	to	Granger	cause	commodity	prices	in	either	
sample	or	CPI	in	the	ADV	sample,	it	does	Granger	cause	CPI	in	the	ALL	sample.		This	suggests	that	
while	 inflation	 in	advanced	countries	may	be	unaffected	by	movements	 in	excess	 liquidity	 (apart	
from	 shocks),	 an	 aggregate	 that	 includes	 inflation	 in	 emerging	 countries	 is	 sensitive	 to	 excess	
liquidity.	
The	dominant	factor	in	both	samples	that	drives	commodity	prices	appears	to	be	GDP.		GDP	
Granger	 causes	 commodity	 prices	 at	 a	 level	 of	 significance	 greater	 than	 1	 percent.	 	 This	 lends	
                                                            
10   The VEC models were run in eViews as unrestricted VARs with the lagged level variables included as 
“exogenous” parameters.  This is an alternate way of running a VEC model in eViews instead of selecting the VEC 
option. 
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support	 to	 the	 theory	that	 fluctuations	 in	commodity	prices	are	mostly	demand	driven,	assuming	
that	this	is	a	positive	relationship.		
These	Granger	causality	tests	only	examine	the	impact	of	the	short‐run	variables,	so	they	do	
not	 say	anything	about	 the	significance	of	 any	 long‐run	 impacts.	By	estimating	 the	coefficients	of	
the	 lagged	 level	variables	 from	each	VEC,	 the	direction	of	 the	 long‐run	 impact	of	one	variable	on	
another	 can	 be	 determined.	 For	 example,	 to	 find	 the	 long	 run	 impact	 of	 CPI	 on	 GDP	 in	 the	 ADV	
sample,	the	coefficient	on	the	level	variable	for	CPI	lagged	3	quarters	is	divided	by	the	coefficient	on	
the	level	variable	for	GDP	lagged	3	quarters	and	then	multiplied	by	negative	one.	Table	6	provides	
the	 estimated	 long‐run	 impacts	 and	 their	 directions.	 	 Unfortunately,	 most	 “long‐run”	 coeffcients	
were	not	significant	(t‐stats	did	no	exceed	2),	so	the	direction	of	their	estimated	long‐run	impacts	
should	 be	 interpreted	 with	 caution.	 	 The	 only	 impacts	 for	 which	 both	 level	 coefficients	 were	
significant	were	for	the	long‐run	impacts	of	CPI	and	MON	on	GDP.	Both	indicated	that	increases	in	
the	price	level	and	excess	liquidity	negatively	impact	the	output	in	the	long	run.	
Impulse	response	functions	explain	reactions	of	an	endogenous	variable	to	a	“shock”	in	the	
error	term	of	one	of	the	VEC	equations.		Care	should	be	taken	before	these	shocks	are	interpreted	to	
be	 movements	 in	 economic	 variables	 that	 are	 truly	 unexpected	 by	 economic	 agents	 in	 the	 real	
world.		As	Rudebusch	(1998)	shows,	when	looking	at	the	Federal	Funds	rate,	most	monetary	policy	
shocks	 in	VAR	models	 in	 the	 literature	are	uncorrelated	with	shocks	as	perceived	by	 the	Federal	
Funds	rate	futures	market.		Nonetheless,	whether	this	discrepancy	is	true	for	other	macroeconomic	
variables	 or	 those	measured	on	 a	 global	 scale	 like	 in	 this	paper	 remains	 unknown.	 	 For	now	we	
assume	that	shocks	to	the	error	terms	are	exogenous	to	the	model	and	unexpected	by	agents	in	the	
system.			
	 Only	the	impulse	response	functions	(Figure	2)	and	variance	decompositions	(Figure	3)	that	
are	 relevant	 to	 this	 analysis	 are	 provided;	 results	 for	 the	 remaining	 variables	 are	 available	 on	
request.	 	Between	the	ALL	and	ADV	samples,	positive	shocks	to	GDP	positively	impact	commodity	
prices	one	and	two	quarters	after	the	shock.		This	provides	more	evidence	to	support	the	“demand	
channel”	explanation	for	part	of	the	rise	in	commodity	prices.	 	However,	while	there	is	a	negative	
reaction	 to	 this	 shock	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 the	 fourth	 quarter	 in	 the	 ADV	 sample,	 this	 effect	
disappears	in	the	ALL	sample.		
	 In	 the	 second	 quarter	 after	 a	 positive	 shock	 to	 excess	 liquidity	 commodity	 prices	 are	
positively	impacted	in	both	samples,	but	the	effect	is	smaller	and	marginally	significant	in	the	ALL	
sample.		In	addition,	prices	are	negatively	impacted	in	the	fourth	quarter	after	the	shock	and	then	
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positively	 again	 in	 the	 sixth	 and	 seventh	 quarters	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample.	 	 Including	 the	 emerging	
markets	into	the	global	aggregate	conveys	important	information	about	excess	liquidity	in	the	BRIC	
countries	that	is	ignored	by	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	in	the	advanced	countries.		This	also	provides	
additional	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 excess	 liquidity	 shocks	 can	 push	 commodity	 prices	
higher	and	that	demand	growth	cannot	account	for	all	commodity	price	inflation.		Note	that	shocks	
to	the	interest	rate	do	not	significantly	impact	prices,	whether	it	is	consumer	or	commodity	prices.		
In	fact,	 in	the	ADV	sample,	shocks	to	the	interest	rate	positively	 impact	commodity	prices.	 	These	
results	for	the	interest	rate	are	in	contrast	with	the	previous	studies	on	global	aggregates	(Belke	et	
al	 (2010),	 Hua	 (1998),	 and	 Swaray	 (2008))	 and	 the	 predictions	 of	 theory	 of	 Frankel	 (1986).	 	 It	
appears	 that	monetary	 flows	 into	 the	commodity	markets	are	 indicated	by	excess	 liquidity	 in	 the	
system	rather	than	flows	that	are	signaled	by	the	nominal	interest	rate.	
	 Shocks	to	commodity	prices	do	not	robustly	impact	CPI.		In	the	ADV	sample,	the	effect	is	just	
barely	significantly	positive,	while	in	the	ALL	sample,	there	is	no	significant	impact.	 	This	result	is	
similar	to	the	peculiar	result	of	the	Granger	causality	test,	as	one	would	expect	that	 if	commodity	
prices	did	not	affect	CPI	in	the	ALL	sample,	then	it	should	not	impact	it	in	the	ADV	sample.		
	 It	is	in	the	variance	decompositions	that	the	differences	between	the	ADV	and	ALL	samples	
are	more	clearly	demonstrated.		In	explaining	the	variation	in	CPI,	the	share	explained	by	shocks	to	
GDP	after	two	quarters	out	drops	from	about	40%	in	the	ADV	sample	to	20%	in	the	ALL	sample.		
Shocks	to	excess	liquidity	explain	less	than	10%	in	the	ADV	sample,	but	this	share	gradually	grows	
to	 explaining	 40%	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 CPI	 in	 the	 ALL	 sample.	 	Most	 importantly	 to	 this	 analysis,	
shocks	 to	GDP	explain	 roughly	35%	of	 the	variation	 in	commodity	prices	 in	 the	ADV	sample,	but	
this	eventually	drops	to	about	20%	in	the	ALL	sample.		Although	shocks	to	excess	liquidity	appear	
to	 explain	 relatively	 very	 little	 in	 the	 variation	 in	 commodity	 prices	 in	 the	 ADV	 sample,	 this	
influence	eventually	grows	to	about	45%.			
This	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 two	 samples	 suggests	 that	 assuming	 that	 only	 advanced	
countries	 are	needed	 to	 serve	 as	proxies	 for	 global	 fluctuations	 ignores	 information	provided	by	
fluctuations	 in	BRIC	 country	variables.	 	 Examining	only	 advanced	 countries	misattributes	 a	 large	
portion	of	the	variation	in	commodity	prices	to	shocks	in	GDP.		When	including	excess	liquidity	in	
BRIC	 countries	 into	 the	 aggregate,	 a	 larger	 portion	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 prices	 appears	 to	 be	
attributed	 to	 shocks	 to	 excess	 liquidity.	 	When	 it	 comes	 to	unexpected	 shocks	 in	macroeconomic	
variables,	 shocks	 to	 excess	 liquidity	 explain	more	 of	 	 the	 variation	 in	 commodity	 prices	 than	 do	
shocks	to	output.		This	diminishes	the	influence	of	the	demand	channel,	which	many	commentators	
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argued	was	 the	main	 driver	 of	 the	 2000s	 commodity	 bubble.	 	 This	 result	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	
unexpectedly	excessively	 loose	monetary	policy	on	a	global	scale	could	be	an	 important	driver	of	
the	commodity	bubble.	
Also,	 note	 that	 shocks	 to	 the	 interest	 rate	 explain	 relatively	 very	 little	 in	 the	 variation	 in	
commodity	 and	 consumer	 prices	 and	 that	 shocks	 to	 commodity	 prices	 explain	 very	 little	 in	 the	
variation	in	CPI;	this	holds	for	both	samples.		Once	again,	this	demonstrates	that	when	factoring	in	
shocks	to	excess	liquidity	among	other	macroeconomic	variables,	shocks	to	the	global	interest	rate	
perform	relatively	poorly	in	indicating	variation	in	prices.		As	the	Granger	causality	tests	suggested,	
measures	of	an	overall	“global”	interest	rate	may	be	meaningless	in	an	aggregated	context.	
	
VII.	 Conclusion	and	Policy	Implications	
	 The	results	of	the	impulse	response	functions	and	variance	decompositions	confirm	some	of	
the	previous	findings	reported	in	Belke	et.	al.	(2010),	Hua	(1998),	and	Swaray	(2008)	that	suggest	
that	positive	 shocks	 to	 liquidity	positively	 impact	 commodity	prices.	 	 In	particular,	 both	 samples	
suggest	that	this	is	a	short‐run	impact	that	occurs	after	two	quarters.		However,	in	the	sample	that	
includes	 information	 about	 liquidity	 from	 BRIC	 countries,	 excess	 liquidity	 positively	 affects	
commodity	 prices	 after	 six	 and	 seven	 quarters	 as	 well.	 	 The	 insignificant	 results	 of	 Granger	
causality	 tests	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 monetary	 variables	 on	 commodity	 prices	 suggests	 that	 this	
relationship	is	limited	to	movements	in	liquidity	that	is	unexpected	by	agents	in	the	system.		These	
“shocks”	could	be	attributed	to	a	number	of	factors	including	exogenous	monetary	policy	changes	
such	 as	 the	 unprecedented	 responses	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 during	 and	 after	 the	 2008	 global	
financial	crisis.	
	 Despite	 this	monetary	 influence,	 Granger	 causality	 tests,	 impulse	 response	 functions,	 and	
variance	decompositions	for	both	samples	all	point	to	the	positive	influence	that	 increased	global	
economic	demand	has	on	commodity	prices.		This	supports	the	argument	that	accelerated	rates	of	
economic	growth	in	emerging	economies	is	partially	responsible	for	elevated	commodity	prices	in	
the	past	decade.		Nonetheless,	according	to	the	variance	decompositions,	when	BRIC	countries	are	
included	in	the	global	aggregate	the	demand	channel	reduces	in	importance.		The	impact	of	shocks	
to	excess	liquidity	rises	in	importance	when	BRIC	liquidity	is	accounted	for.			
	 This	 discrepancy	 between	 samples	 has	 two	 implications	 for	 research	 and	 policy.	 	 First,	
empirical	research	that	claims	to	analyze	relationships	at	a	“global”	 level	needs	to	account	for	the	
growing	 influence	 of	 emerging	 economies	 and	 not	 simply	 the	 advanced	 economies.	 	 Otherwise,	
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results	may	be	 biased	 as	 they	were	when	 too	much	of	 the	 forecast	 error	 variance	 in	 commodity	
prices	was	attributed	to	shocks	to	output	when	it	should	have	been	attributed	to	shocks	to	excess	
liquidity.	 	 Second,	 those	 who	 criticize	 expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 advanced	 countries,	
especially	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 for	 pushing	 up	 commodity	 prices	 should	 also	 direct	 their	
attention	towards	monetary	authorities	elsewhere,	especially	the	BRIC	countries,	since	information	
on	 excess	 liquidity	 from	 these	 countries	 adds	 to	 the	 influence	 that	 global	 excess	 liquidity	has	on	
commodity	 prices.	 	 Third,	 monetary	 policymakers	 in	 the	 advanced	 countries	 need	 to	 closely	
monitor	liquidity	in	the	BRIC	countries,	since	the	discrepancies	between	the	ALL	and	ADV	samples	
suggests	 that	BRIC	excess	 liquidity	affects	commodity	prices	 in	a	way	that	cannot	be	captured	by	
examining	advanced	country	data	alone.	
Despite	the	theory	of	Frankel	(1986)	and	the	findings	of	previous	global	VAR/VEC	analyses,	
interest	 rates,	 especially	 shocks,	 have	 a	 minimal	 impact	 on	 consumer	 and	 commodity	 prices.		
Perhaps	 future	 studies	 should	 include	an	 interest	 rate	 in	 their	analysis	 that	more	closely	 reflects	
interest	 rates	 associated	 with	 information	 used	 by	 commodity	 consumers,	 producers,	 and	
investors.	 	Some	analyses	such	as	Hua	(1998)	use	the	LIBOR	rate,	which	is	highly	associated	with	
developed	financial	markets	in	the	advanced	economies.	 	Data	quality	and	availability	in	the	BRIC	
countries	 severely	 limited	 the	 length	 of	 the	 time	 period	 analyzed	 and	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 data.		
Finding	 longer	 sample	 periods	 or	 higher	 frequency	 data	 can	 help	 to	 minimize	 bias	 in	 future	
research.		In	this	paper,	monetary	aggregates	and	short‐term	interest	rates	were	loosely	connected	
to	monetary	 policy.	 	 It	 would	 also	 be	 interesting	 to	 directly	 examine	 how	 special	 programs	 like	
quantitative	easing	influenced	global	liquidity.		
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Appendix A – Tables and Figures 
          Table 1 - GDP shares 
 
 
 1995 2009 
ADV as a % of OECD 92% 89% 
ADV as a % of World 61% 50% 
BRIC as a % of World 15% 24% 
ALL as a % of World 76% 74% 
 
 
Note: ADV  aggregates 10 advanced and 
euro zone economies including Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and 
the US.; 
BRIC represents Brazil, Russia, India and 
China; 
All includes ADV and BRIC countries. 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators 
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Table 2 - Unit Root Tests 
 
                Stationarity indicated in bold   
 ADV Sample   
 
GDP CPI MON INT COM 
 
Level 
 
ADF 
-1.7079* 
 (0.7360) 
-2.3872* 
 (0.3824) 
-2.2859* 
 (0.4350) 
-2.9710* 
 (0.1486) 
-3.1161* 
 (0.1117) 
 
DF-GLS -1.8675* -2.3562* -2.0708* -2.810789* -2.916968†  
KPSS 0.1672‡‡   0.1889‡‡ 0.1447‡ 0.0777♦  0.1527‡‡  
1st Difference      
 
ADF (no trend) 
-3.4685†† 
(0.0122) 
-6.0294††† 
(0.0000) 
-4.0883††† 
(0.0020) 
-4.2204††† 
 (0.0013) 
-6.0158††† 
 (0.0000) 
 
DF-GLS -3.7162†† -6.0672††† -4.0488††† -3.7257††† -6.0739†††  
KPSS 0.0717♦ 0.0926♦ 0.0489♦ 0.0751♦ 0.0587♦  
 
                         
                                    ALL Sample 
 
 GDP CPI MON INT  
Level  
ADF 
-2.4926* 
 (0.3307) 
-2.2418* 
 (0.4583) 
-2.6290* 
 (0.2695) 
-2.1107* 
 (0.5290) 
 
DF-GLS -2.3819* -2.1441* -2.5662* -1.2772*  
KPSS 0.0952♦  0.2132‡‡ 0.1281‡ 0.1667‡‡  
1st Difference      
ADF (no trend) 
-3.8276††† 
(0.0045) 
-5.4421††† 
(0.0000) 
-3.5459††† 
(0.0099) 
-6.2455††† 
 (0.0000) 
 
DF-GLS -3.4190†† -5.4366††† -3.6561†† -1.3940*  
KPSS 0.1077♦ 0.0567♦ 0.0543♦ 0.1438‡  
2nd Difference      
DF-GLS       -1.6456*  
KPSS       0.0866♦  
‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 5% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 1% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 5% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
‡‡‡ Rejection of the null of unit root at the 1% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
♦ Failure to reject of the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is stationary  
* Failure to reject the null of unit root at the 10% level; therefore series is non-stationary  
 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses; COM is the same for both samples 
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          Table 3 - Pesaran Test  
 
           Critical Values at 10% L.O.S.   
ADV Sample  ALL Sample  
Dep. 
Variable F-stat Result 
Dep. 
Variable F-stat Result 
ΔRGDP 2.251 no cointegration ΔRGDP 2.340 no cointegration 
ΔCPI 2.972 ambiguous ΔCPI 3.697 cointegration 
ΔMON 3.672 cointegration ΔMON 1.708 no cointegration 
ΔINT 2.352 no cointegration ΔINT 1.104 no cointegration 
ΔCOM 1.064 no cointegration ΔCOM 1.700 no cointegration 
 
 
 Table 4 - Comparison of Model Fit   
 
      
 ADV Sample     
 Adjusted-R2    
Dep. Variable ΔRGDP ΔCPI ΔMON ΔINT ΔCOM 
L-R included 0.629 0.581 0.639 0.556 0.575 
not included 0.578 0.492 0.534 0.491 0.572 
      
  
Akaike 
information 
criterion 
Schwarz 
criterion    
L-R included -29.247 -26.227    
not included -28.277 -26.145    
      
 ALL Sample     
 Adjusted-R2     
Dep. Variable ΔRGDP ΔCPI ΔMON ΔINT ΔCOM  
L-R included 0.554 0.584 0.652 0.413 0.562  
not included 0.481 0.447 0.622 0.406 0.525  
       
  
Akaike 
information 
criterion 
Schwarz 
criterion    
 
L-R included -27.913 -24.006     
not included -27.171 -24.151     
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Note: Variables that Granger cause the dependent variable at the 10% level or greater are 
Table 5 - Granger Causality Tests 
 
 
ADV Sample  ALL Sample   
Dependent variable: ΔRGDP Dependent variable: ΔRGDP  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔCPI 15.37785 0.0005 ΔCPI 12.78546 0.0051  
ΔMON 1.310898 0.5192 ΔMON 9.193505 0.0268  
ΔINT 0.423823 0.8090 ΔINT 0.429312 0.9341  
ΔCOM 4.671602 0.0967 ΔCOM 2.331124 0.5066  
All 20.85097 0.0076 All 19.24144 0.0829  
       
Dependent variable: ΔCPI Dependent variable: ΔCPI  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 16.80843 0.0002 ΔRGDP 29.04524 0.0000  
ΔMON 2.308153 0.3153 ΔMON 7.100639 0.0688  
ΔINT 3.566596 0.1681 ΔINT 9.64327 0.0219  
ΔCOM 6.452635 0.0397 ΔCOM 6.03073 0.1101  
All 53.82122 0.0000 All 63.06572 0.0000  
       
Dependent variable: ΔMON Dependent variable: ΔMON  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 7.619528 0.0222 ΔRGDP 9.205386 0.0267  
ΔCPI 5.488917 0.0643 ΔCPI 0.940509 0.8156  
ΔINT 0.004187 0.9979 ΔINT 2.940834 0.4008  
ΔCOM 2.009606 0.3661 ΔCOM 0.772342 0.8561  
All 27.77509 0.0005 All 32.06436 0.0014  
       
Dependent variable: ΔINT Dependent variable: ΔINT  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 4.372917 0.1123 ΔRGDP 4.388929 0.2224  
ΔCPI 5.149174 0.0762 ΔCPI 2.08839 0.5543  
ΔMON 1.813842 0.4038 ΔMON 1.079492 0.7820  
ΔCOM 3.876191 0.1440 ΔCOM 0.068344 0.9953  
All 19.27495 0.0135 All 21.13584 0.0484  
       
Dependent variable: ΔCOM Dependent variable: ΔCOM  
Excluded Chi-sq p-value Excluded Chi-sq p-value  
ΔRGDP 13.95322 0.0009 ΔRGDP 19.77027 0.0002  
ΔCPI 9.726949 0.0077 ΔCPI 1.655177 0.6469  
ΔMON 3.336818 0.1885 ΔMON 1.959744 0.5808  
ΔINT 2.398765 0.3014 ΔINT 5.323697 0.1496  
All 45.13677 0.0000 All 50.90374 0.0000  
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highlighted in bold 
 
Table 6 - Implied Long Run Impacts 
        
   Impacted Variable 
   GDP CPI MON INT COM 
 Impa
ct of 
 
Varia
ble 
GDP  1.214 -0.130 -8.466 -15.093 
ADV  CPI -2.600  3.095 19.670 9.004 
Sample MON -0.893 0.541  -30.494 -9.753 
 INT 0.007 -0.005 0.013  0.134 
 COM 0.040 0.140 -0.129 3.170  
        
   Impacted Variable 
   GDP CPI MON INT COM 
 Impa
ct of 
 
Varia
ble 
GDP  4.537 0.700 39.375 16.029 
ALL  CPI -1.256  2.529 58.198 -2.253 
Sample MON -0.638 2.532  -0.638 7.017 
 INT 0.011 -0.016 -0.008  -0.039 
 COM 0.048 -0.149 -0.109 -0.972  
Note: bold numbers indicate both coefficients have t‐stats greater than 2 and are therefore significant 
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Figure 1 – Global Aggregates 1995Q2 – 2010Q3 
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Figure 2 – Impulse Response Functions 
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ALL Sample 
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Figure 3 – Variance Decomposition 
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ALL Sample 
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Appendix	B	–	Global	Aggregation	Method	
	 First,	country	currencies	were	converted	into	US	dollars	at	PPP	exchange	rates.	This	method	
accounts	for	differences	in	the	purchasing	power	of	one	dollar	in	different	countries.			Specifically,	
the	formula,	adapted	from	Sousa	and	Zaghini	(2004,	2006)11	adjusts	the	nominal	market	exchange	
rate,	E,	for	the	level	of	inflation	in	country	i	relative	to	the	US.		The	formula	is	as	follows:		
		
	 While	output	and	excess	liquidity	were	aggregated	into	global	variables	by	summing	GDPs	
and	broad	money	supplies,	CPI	and	the	interest	rate	were	calculated	by	taking	a	weighted	average	
of	each	variable	using	GDP	of	country	i	relative	to	the	GDP	of	the	entire	sample	as	weights.	For	
example	for	CPI	in	the	ALL	sample	at	time	t:	
	
                                                            
11   We are indebted to Andrea Zaghini for sharing the methodology for how the PPP exchange rates were 
calculated in Sousa and Zaghini (2004, 2006). 
